Constanza Bustamante, a research fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), is my guest in this episode. She joins me to discuss quantum policy at the nexus of national and economic security. Constanza contrasts China’s state-led, scale-oriented model with the U.S.’s science-first, private-sector translation approach; traces bipartisan continuity from the National Quantum Initiative Act through today; and examines Europe’s growing techno-nationalism and reciprocity gaps. Constanza argues broad tariffs risk hobbling a nascent U.S. quantum supply chain, explores quantum sensing as a near-term “atomic advantage”, weighs research-security safeguards against academic openness, and much more.
Transcript
Yuval Boger: Hello, Constanza, and thank you for joining me today.
Constanza Bustamante: Hi, Yuval. Great to see you. Thank you for having me.
Yuval: So who are you and what do you do?
Constanza: So great question. So I’m a fellow, a research fellow with the Center for a New American Security or CNAS. We’re a think tank in Washington, D.C. So we’re a nonprofit, independent, and bipartisan research organization where we focus broadly on national security and defense policy for the United States. I’m specifically with the technology and national security program at CNAS where our program in general focuses on emerging technologies, AI, biotech, quantum, of course, in cybersecurity and some various issues touching on U.S. China competition and implications for national security. I, in particular, I’m focused on quantum tech and that intersection with national security and broadly thinking about issues of how these technologies have implications and applications for national security and economic security as well, assessing the status of these technologies and kind of ongoing bottlenecks for that development and most importantly thinking about what the U.S. government can do to advance U.S. innovation we solve those bottlenecks and advance U.S. leadership.
Yuval: Forgive my ignorance, but I didn’t hear about CNAS before I met you. Is that been established for a long time? How many people are in CNAS? Maybe you could give a little bit of background there?
Constanza: Yeah, absolutely. And not a worry at all. I’m happy to talk more about CNAS. So CNAS has been around for close to 20 years now. And we have a team of about, fluctuates a little bit, but I would say about 50 people work at CNAS. Our tech team that I mentioned that focuses on emerging technologies, we’re about eight people. We’ll be hiring a few more folks in the coming months, so it’ll be growing. It’s a growing team within our organization. And I think that reflects just the rising relevance of emerging technologies and science and technology policy in the kind of mainstream conversations around national security and economic security. So it’s been exciting to see that rise and see that reflected in our organization as well.
Yuval: Quantum technology sensing and computing has been recognized as strategic to many countries. So let me ask you sort of an open-ended question. Give us the lay of the land. How are key country blocks, you know, U.S., EU, China, how are they thinking about quantum and how are they thinking about collaborating with other countries on that topic?
Constanza: Yeah, that’s a big question. I think the common thread across the various geographies that you just mentioned is that there seems to be pretty wide-ranging consensus that quantum will be critical to both national security and economic security. And I think that starts from the premise, that it has kind of positive and negative connotations, insofar as what the technologies can do and what they mean for country strategies. So there is agreement that quantum technologies will revolutionize a number of industries and that that will lead to important economic gains. But also that some of these technologies will have nefarious purposes that are critical to our national security. So obviously, here the most commonly mentioned one is the ability of sufficiently large quantum computers to break our current cryptographic systems and all the security repercussions that would have in exposing very sensitive information that obviously it’s in our national interest to protect. So given that range of very positive, you know, kind of industry revolutionizing and economic gains that come from that, all the way to how these new tools can be used against our interests makes it in the interest of all these countries to try to stay at the cutting edge and be able to have pretty good grasp of these technologies, and not just adopting them, but also leading that execution. Because obviously, we also know that the countries that lead the rise of these emerging technologies have advantages that are then very hard to make up for if you’re late to the game. So if you’re first, then you can capture emerging markets. You can be the first to adopt and reap the benefits of those tools. You can attract talent and investments that are then kind of also self-reinforcing gains that then make it increasingly hard to catch up if you’re late to the game. So all these countries are trying to basically, it’s created this race dynamic around quantum, right? So for better or worse, it’s brought to the fore the importance of these technologies and therefore made countries think about how they can best invest or more strategically invest and build their work, their domestic workforce and think ahead about how to scale these technologies and so on. So that kind of gives you the context. To be more specific in how different regions are pursuing that, I think a big difference here is if you think about U.S. and China. So China, and this is not specific to quantum, but China has a state-led model where it’s the government that takes the lead in setting strategies and executing and investing in their strategies. as opposed to a more private sector driven approach, which is more the, that’s more what the model is in the United States and what we’re more used to. So what that means for China is that they’ve been able to invest substantial amounts of money. And I think something that gets lost in kind of a discussion of, okay, how much has China actually invested? Can we actually tell how much they’re investing? I think beyond discussing this, specifics of how much money, I think it’s important to note that China is way less sensitive, basically, to economic downturns or the profit motive, and that makes their investments very resilient. And I think, by the way, I think they definitely have spent more than the United States. So I think we know in general, even if we don’t know by what margin, but I think they definitely invested substantially more than the United States. And, like, looking forward, it’s very likely that they will continue to invest no matter what. They’re not really counting, well, did it make me money this year or not, and adjusting accordingly. They understand that this is a strategic technology that they should continue to support, and they will do that. And the other thing that’s important about China is that, and again, this cuts across or goes beyond quantum in particular, is that they are a very impressive manufacturing power. So once they figure out basically the underlying technical breakthroughs that they need to unleash basically the promise of quantum, they’re very good at scaling up technologies. And they’re very good at setting up new facilities and bringing a technology from across the innovation cycle and produce that at scale. And that’s another place where the United States lags. So the United States may be at the innovative cutting edge, but we have trouble bringing that technology to a scale of manufacturing and keeping those capabilities in house without creating big supply chain vulnerabilities down the line. In the United States, just to close it, I think we can talk about Europe later, since I’ve been talking for a while now, but in the US the approach to quantum and many other fields as well has been a science first approach where we fund, the government funds R&D, research and development, early stage research, and some of the talent development piece, even though we’re not doing so well there, and I can come back to that later. And then kind of trusting that the private sector will then take those innovations and applying them and integrating them into practical technologies and then relying on the private venture capital and private investments to support that translation. So those are big differences. And obviously, I mean, I think the United States has a leading position, and I think that’s definitely worth mentioning: the United States is a quantum superpower. And I think we should be proud of the excellent track record and really cutting-edge work that’s being done in the United States across a few different regions. So we have big regional quantum hubs like around Massachusetts, Colorado, California, Illinois as well. I think there’s definitely a lot of talent. But I think we’re coming to a place of reckoning on, are we ready to really move from the innovation and breakthroughs that happen at the early stage and then scale up and have the supply chain that we need in-house to really see the whole cycle, not just the early stages and breakthroughs?
Yuval: Thank you for that. I believe that the National Quantum Strategy started that the first Trump administration continued through the Biden administration and now is back to Trump. Do you see substantial differences in the way that these Republican and Democratic administrations look at quantum, choose where to invest or otherwise think about quantum?
Constanza: Yes, you’re asking about partisan differences maybe. I think definitely worth highlighting what you just said at the beginning, which is that it was the first Trump administration that really highlighted quantum, not just as a scientific field, but as a critical technology for, for national security. And we should acknowledge too, that federal investments in quantum had started decades before and had been going for a long time, it’s not that it was the Trump administration that started from scratch, basically, on those investments. But they really doubled down on the strategic importance of an increasingly mature technology that’s not just relegated to the lab. So I think they definitely deserve a lot of kudos for that. And, you know, that that was not just kind of like a one-time report that they put out. They really had this vision for a nationally coordinated strategy that led to the National Quantum Coordination Office in the White House, this huge interagency work, and then working together with Congress to pass the National Quantum Initiative Act. And at that time, like today, Congress was also led by Republicans in both chambers, and so it led to a pretty quick passage of that bill as well. In that strategy or the National Quantum Initiative Act that passed into legislation in 2018, led to the next five years of really substantial investments. I believe they, if I’m remembering the numbers correctly, the investments went from about $200 million a year prior to 2018. to close to a billion every year. So that’s very substantial investments that have led to a lot of advances and cementing and bolstering that leadership that the United States had. So that’s incredible. I think bringing it back to today and where we stand, if you think about how Republicans and Democrats think in general about science and technology, and even beyond that about government investments and the role of government in the economy, Republicans in general tend to have this view of seeing the government as playing a key role in funding basic research because they see that as a market failure where the private sector is not so directly invested in it because they don’t know what that basic research will lead to. So if it doesn’t benefit them directly, they’re going to invest less, and therefore that’s a gap that the government can fill, that it wouldn’t otherwise be filled by any other actor. And also understanding that basic research can lead to incredibly large ROIs if you think in sufficiently long time cycles. So that’s like a general approach or philosophy, I guess, among Republicans,so that probably makes them more likely to support, when it comes to quantum, to support more the early stages, rather than increasingly supporting applications or commercialization of the technologies. Now, with that said, I think if we look back just a few years with the Chips and Science Act that passed in 2022, that was a bipartisan bill, where many Republicans really went kind of against the dogma of not having the government support industrial policies or have a stronger role in, supporting economic growth and funding, like, private sector directly, and understood that that was a critical technology, that semiconductors in this case were a very important strategic technology that the government should support and should go through very substantial investments, if that meant that they would secure that technology in the United States. And so I think we’re seeing also similar dynamics emerge in quantum. So we’re seeing a lot of Republican senators and members of the House of Representatives also kind of come in support of those more involved, I guess, roles for government in spurring quantum. And I think that means that it’s not like in general they’re now changing to be thinking more like Democrats, but I think they see quantum as a kind of an exception, it’s not like any other technology. It’s a very strategic one that they want to make sure that the U.S. continues to lead in, and therefore they’re willing to make more concessions than they would otherwise. So I think that’s very interesting to see, and I think that leads me to think very positively and optimistically about this administration, accelerating some of those key legislative pieces like the reauthorization of the National Quantum Initiative Act, which by the way, expired in 2023, or the main R&D provisions expired in 2023, and other activity coming directly from the Trump administration to bring new priority and awareness to quantum and being willing, I think, to make substantial investments because they see that as a critical technology.
Yuval: Let’s talk a little bit about the EU. One, we do see that EU member states are investing heavily in quantum, Germany and France and several others are putting billions. There’s a sense that maybe there’s a stronger techno-nationalism in the EU, a strong preference for local suppliers. Some say that it’s much easier for EU companies to sell in the U.S. than for U.S. companies to sell into the EU. Do you see it that way? And what should the company, what should the U.S. do, if anything, to sort of level the playing field?
Constanza: Yeah, that’s a great question. It is definitely something I’ve been looking at because I think so much lately the focus of the U.S. has been looking inward, thinking about how we can bolster our domestic capabilities. And I think that’s a key aspect of this. And I’m so glad that that awareness of where we are falling short domestically can be improved. I think that’s great strategic thinking and it will pay out for years and generations perhaps to come. But obviously there’s this piece of, okay, we’re not alone in the world. We need for some things, specifically for certain supply chain components and materials—we don’t yet produce those here. We can’t, overnight, create those in the United States. So we still have some reliance on, and pretty important reliance, I should say, not just a little bit, on suppliers around the world, including some that traditionally we think about as key allies and partners in Europe, but also in Asia and beyond. So what does that mean for the United States? How should they be tracking these different developments in these countries, how they’re thinking about quantum and how we should engage with them moving forward. So I think it’s interesting to start thinking about how different allies to the United States are taking different stances, basically, and might mean that the United States should approach it in different ways, approach our relationship with those different regions differently. So there it’s interesting to see, I mean, what you just described about the EU kind of focusing more on their sovereign capabilities and trying to secure an EU-centric or EU-only even supply chain for them, as opposed to maybe allies like Japan and Australia, being much more open to buying U.S. companies’ technologies, buying quantum computers, I mean, including you guys at QuEra in Japan, and seeing those different dynamics that are arising. I think in terms of going back to Europe in particular, I mean, I think this is a point where continued monitoring and engagement with Europe will be helpful in the sense of curbing, kind of making it very clear to Europe, how various European countries are benefiting from U.S. government investments. I mean, you kind of alluded to this, But even beyond accessing the commercial markets, even at the R&D stage, we have innovation units within the Department of Defense and others that are open to international performers that are funding universities and companies from European countries, like the ones you mentioned, France, Germany, Austria, etc. I mean, so many others in Europe. They’re having access to that government investment and the support from pretty strong federal agencies like the Department of Defense and civilian agencies as well. And it seems like that’s increasingly not being reciprocated. And I didn’t even mention, but also how many European scientists are trained at U.S. universities as well. So I think the trend toward making it more difficult for U.S. companies to participate in European quantum research and development or kind of early stage commercialization programs is a concerning trend that the U.S. government should be aware of and hopefully continue to engage in conversations with European partners to change that behavior. because I think in the end we should point out that we both benefit from accessing each other’s ecosystems, right? I think we’re at a stage where we want to continue those scientific engagements, early stage commercialization, kind of moving forward the applications, understanding where quantum computers, quantum sensors can be most useful, continue to have access to those global supply chains, right? And we shouldn’t be, it would be detrimental to ourselves and to European partners to continue to close themselves to the most innovative companies and technology and enabling technologies out there.
Yuval: There’s a saying that when you saw hammers, every problem looks like a nail. And these days, some say that tariffs is the solution to many problems, including trade imbalance and access to. to market and so on. I think you wrote an op-ed about tariffs. How do you see tariffs playing out both in rebalancing the playing field as well as securing the supply chain?
Constanza: Yeah, great question. You know, definitely something that’s interesting to track and think how it’s impacting many, many industries, but including quantum. So I think if we go to the original motivation for tariffs, or one of the many motivations for tariffs that had been outlined by the Trump administration. A big one that gets mentioned a lot is, well, we have this vision for, if we want to reshore key supply chains back to the United States and ensure in the long term that we’ll have very strong domestic capabilities, then we want to penalize, we want to make it harder for international companies, to reach the U.S. market or make it more favorable for American suppliers to sell to the American market. And so therefore, using tariffs might be painful in the short term, but over time, that will create an incentive for companies and others that are purchasing these materials and components to buy local. And I think in general that motivation of strengthening domestic supply chains is absolutely correct. Like, we want to strengthen our own capabilities, of course. But what’s special or different about the quantum industry in particular that’s different from much more mature industries—that perhaps can absorb the extra cost of the tariffs and adjust and likely lose some margins but in the end, they will be fine—is that quantum is a very nascent and fragile industry. So it’s growing for sure, and I think in the United States, the industry is doing well relatively, relative to other regions of the world. But it’s definitely not mature yet to the point where it can absorb these shocks and pretty sudden rises in costs of supplies and others overnight. And so the risk there is that if you create all these extra burdens, obviously the financial burdens, but even just the added regulatory pain of now dealing with their, like constantly changing tariff rates and lots of additional bureaucratic work that you need to do to make sure that you’re complying and getting additional lawyers and all the extra time that now it takes to get things through customs and all these things. That might be, that might lead to pretty severe long-term harm to the industry that it may not recover from. And especially when we think about, if we go back to the beginning, where we’re talking about kind of like this race to be the first to deploy and benefit from quantum technologies, then every minute matters. And so it’s not something that we can say, oh, if we just delay it by a couple years, that’s fine, the U.S. innovators will get there eventually, it’s fine. If we really care about the national security stakes of quantum technology, and I think the U.S. government definitely understands that, then we should be very against the idea of delaying U.S. innovators and putting all these extra struggles that our competitors in China and Europe and any other region they’re not dealing with. So it just creates a perverse consequence where you are trying to strengthen your domestic supply chain by actually potentially breaking that emerging industry and just making it harder for them to continue doing their work in accelerating those developments and just bringing those things to market and securing that leading position in the world. So hopefully, you know, the tariffs have been done pretty, they’re typically announced in very global terms and then perhaps we’re not always taking the time to see how those impacts might vary across different industries, and hopefully this is something that they didn’t think about at the beginning, but they will come to see that is a negative effect for quantum. I think the administration has said in other parts of their policies when they’ve said, you know, we’re reducing federal support for R&D or various scientific disciplines. They’ve made a point of saying, but this doesn’t apply to key strategic technologies like AI and quantum. And I think hopefully we’ll see that kind of carve out soon enough for quantum technologies when it comes to tariffs as well.
Yuval: Some could say that tariffs are an incentive to the EU or a threat to the EU to say, hey, unless you open the EU more to US suppliers, then EU companies are going to have to face these increasingly high tariffs going into the US.
Constanza: Oh, I see. You’re using the tariffs as leverage to get the EU to open itself up. Yeah, I mean, sure, you can see it as that as well, but I think if at the end of the day, those same US companies that want increased market access to the EU, they can’t even build their own technologies because they no longer can rely on some of the supplies they were getting from the EU itself. It’s kind of like a chicken and egg question. So I think that can be, I think what you’re saying is that it can definitely be a point of negotiation for the US and EU to discuss what they each should do to support one another. But I think we are seeing that across the quantum ecosystem and sensing companies, and I mean, this affects universities as well. So researchers in the quantum ecosystem and startups and bigger companies across sensing and computing, they are importing a fair share of things from Europe. And I think that should give pause both to the U.S. and Europe to think twice about how they’re regulating that and avoiding shooting themselves in the foot. But I think, yeah, there’s a case where maybe both can cede a little bit of ground and reach an agreement that is mutually beneficial. I think especially if we think about how these two regions of the world can create a united front against mutual geopolitical adversaries, then we all stand to benefit.
Yuval: I believe you recently published a report on sensing. I think it was called Atomic Advantage. And I know this podcast usually covers more on computing, but I’m very much. very interested to understand what are the key points and key recommendations that you raise in that report.
Constanza: Yeah, thank you for the chance to talk about sensing. It’s been a great interest of mine. Like you said, I think in general, if the general public or even policymaking audiences think about quantum tech, we usually think about quantum computing first, and that’s reflected in the media, right? We see way more articles about quantum computing than we do of quantum sensing. But also, I mean, very much more practically in terms of private sector investments, investments in quantum computing from venture capital is about 10 times higher than for quantum sensing. So I think there is a disparity there that kind of belies the critical national security applications of quantum sensing. So because I work at that intersection of tech and national security, it seemed obvious to me to highlight how quantum sensors have very direct applications for critical national security vulnerabilities. And the one that I focus on for this report is the increasing vulnerabilities that we’re seeing in the global positioning system or GPS. So we’re seeing rising rates of jamming and spoofing incidents, so basically disruptions of GPS. And if we think about all the things that rely on GPS information for very high precision timing and navigation, then you can quickly realize the huge catastrophe that it would be if we lose access to that in a more permanent way. So these incidents are already impacting military operations. We’ve seen this kind of, it’s come to the fore as well with, in the context of the Russia, the war between Russia and Ukraine, where that has been rampant, but also it’s impacting commercial flights already, up to thousands of commercial flights each day are being impacted by jamming and spoofing. So these sensors, the report basically focuses on how these quantum sensors offer an alternative source of very high precision timing and positioning and navigation capabilities that is immune, It doesn’t rely on radio frequency signals the way you do for GPS. So it’s immune to those threats, and it can provide extremely high precision capabilities for that. And even compared to other alternatives to GPS, it doesn’t rely on, it’s all passive sensors, so it doesn’t rely on emitting signals, and therefore that is also beneficial if you want to maintain stealth in military contexts. And then it also doesn’t rely on specific weather conditions because some of these sensors are relying on magnetic fields or gravity fields for which you don’t need the sky to be clear or you don’t need to, It’s not constrained to other environmental things like that. So most importantly, I think we don’t appreciate how these sensors are much more advanced and ready to be commercialized compared to quantum computers. And so it seems that we have this near-term opportunity to leverage these sensors. They still have some technical bottlenecks in terms of reducing their size, weight, and power and cost. But if we focus on their much more near-term opportunity that we can leverage and focus on, especially from the government thinking about these national security applications, the government can be a huge supporter of these, bringing them to fruition and then unleash a variety of other applications for these sensors in other domains, so not just positioning navigation and timing, but also these sensors can be used for resource exploration, for biomedical imaging and tracking biomarkers, both with more precision, but also even in portable context. So imagine bringing tools like MRI and other ways of brain imaging kind of to the field in portable formats, or also for microchip security inspections. And so there’s a long list of applications for these sensors that I think we’re kind of losing track of that can solve national security vulnerabilities and open new economic markets as well. And finally, because they also share some of the supply chain, some of the technical approaches and supply chains with some of the modalities of quantum computing, especially the ones focused on AMO physics, then we can also make the case that by advancing those sensors, we can also accelerate the supply chains and technical bottlenecks that we still have for quantum computing. It wouldn’t solve everything, but I think it would advance that as well. So there are synergies basically by focusing on sensors, you can bring up and accelerate and strengthen your broader quantum ecosystem, including talent development as well. So I’m presenting that basically in the report as a strategic opportunity that the U.S. government can continue to support.
Yuval: As we get close to the end of our conversation, I wanted to ask you about academia. I think in quantum science, academia plays such a huge role, even more than in other industries. We’ve seen all the Nobel Prizes related to quantum technologies. And my question is, is there a tension developing between the academics who are used to sharing and collaborating in governments who are say, well, yeah, but this is strategically important. Maybe you should think twice before you do this with this other country or this other researcher.
Constanza: Yeah, for sure, for sure. I mean, I think we saw that in the, even in the Biden administration. So I guess going back to the first Trump administration, there was this toward the very end, there was this executive order on research security. And it was not quantum specific, but it was kind of touching on these, having additional precautions around how we share what’s traditionally been pretty open scientific literature and start being more careful and strategic about that and kind of doing more due diligence in scientific collaborations with foreigners, both foreigners in the United States and outside. And the Biden administration took that on and kind of started working on the implementation of that executive order. And specifically, for instance, at the NSF, the National Science Foundation, they started piloting their new research security initiatives with quantum. And I think it led to a lot of these questions of, okay, how do we think about what to protect, like what parts of the research enterprise that relate to quantum should we put safeguards on? What would be the unintended consequences of that? Like, we want to be careful. We don’t want to create so many regulations that it would impede, again, going back to kind of the tariffs discussion, we don’t want to impede the pace of that innovation. We want to just put the minimal safeguards while allowing these scientists to continue to do their work. I think in general, I mean, the common message from the academic scientific community is that they see these international collaborations and being able to share research very openly as conducive to more rapid innovations. They’re worried about their ability to continue to conduct that research, to learn from their international colleagues as well in areas where they might have a comparative advantage and we’re not as advanced in in the United States, so that could be mutually beneficial, or even if you just want to have awareness of what other countries are up to, you want to maintain those collaborations and not close them fully, just to maintain situational awareness. So we’re still seeing that play out, I think, at least when these discussions were unfolding in the past couple of years, there was very acute awareness of the downsides of adding additional safeguards, But also, I think at the same time, even if you ask scientists, they are on board with the idea of this is, you know, quantum is a strategic technology. We understand there are national security concerns. We’re not, I mean, some people might disagree with that. But I think by and large, most scientists were on board with the national security imperative of being careful and understanding that instances of espionage and kind of IP theft and various other ways in which the U.S. innovation ecosystem was being taken advantage of by geopolitical adversaries, that those are real threats. They’re not fabricated. But there might be disagreement in the frequency rate of those instances, but they understand that it’s a thing that exists, and therefore that we should be thinking carefully about it. I think those discussions in terms of like what is the right implementation of this hasn’t been fully solved. But I am optimistic that, I mean, these conversations are so complicated, right? So I think it’s natural that they will take a while. And I’ve actually lost track a little bit of how the NSF is implementing that, but they’re using, I know that this year they’re piloting that program. And they’re using that as an exercise to see what works and what doesn’t and adjust accordingly. So I’m optimistic that they will use the data they get based on that pilot program and continue to iterate and then hopefully that also informs what other agencies that are leading funding for or even conducting themselves research on quantum will also adopt those best practices.
Yuval: In last hypothetical, if you could have dinner with one of the quantum greats dead or alive, who would that be?
Constanza: Oh, great question. I think going back to what I was saying about quantum sensing since that’s been my focus. I think in doing my research for that report, I became so fascinated with some of these true pioneers in the fields of atomic physics that are doing really beautiful work, like just enabling such incredible levels of precision measurement that are advancing not only, how we understand and apply quantum technologies, but also pushing the frontiers of scientific understanding and revisiting, you know, the theory of relativity, Einstein’s theories of relativity and our understanding of gravity. And anyway, it’s just so fascinating. So I think I remember from that research, a few scientists come to mind. Most of them are still alive, so I think that’s impressive as well, I could still have dinner with these people. So, I mean, I’m thinking like Steve Chu with his pioneering work on laser cooling, Jun Ye, obviously, in Colorado and his continued breakthroughs in next generation atomic clocks and optical lattice clocks or nuclear clocks even. Those would be two, I think. Oh, so many people working on Bose–Einstein condensates as well,pioneering work at MIT on that. So maybe Wolfgang Ketterlethere. I think those are just three, but in general, I would say it’s so many scientists that fall more on the quantum sensing side of things, but whose work so many other scientists are also using for various modalities of quantum computing. So I think those would be really incredible people to talk to, and have dinner with.
Yuval: Wonderful, Constanza. Thank you so much for joining me today.
Constanza: Thank you. It was a pleasure.